Prompt Injection Detector
Detects prompt injection: text that tries to take control of the AI assistant reading it. The text comes with its source, because that changes the answer: a user may give the assistant instructions, but a retrieved page, email or tool result may not. Jev answers one Noul and returns P(injection); code blocks at a threshold you tune with the sweep. Against it: the phrase deny-list most filters start with ($0), and an LLM classifier, which has to read the very text that may be attacking it. Measured: accuracy, injections missed, safe inputs blocked, and the threshold sweep.
With Jev
◐ ▮▮▮ ▦Without Jev
LLM · CODECalls Jev and every baseline for real. Nothing is saved.
Runs every labeled row, one at a time: 24 rows × every variant, all real, paid calls. Rows run sequentially so latency measures the model, not a traffic jam. The run is saved as it goes and lands in History.